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COMMENTS
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
On the whole, the writer of this comment is full of admiration
for the work of the American Law Institute, and especially for
its Restatement of the Law of Contracts. But there are a few
definitions and theories found in this restatement with which he
cannot agree, and he desires to state his position so that it may
be a matter of record. He has already made these points before
the meetings of the American Law Institute and in so doing has
discovered that a large number, if not a majority, of members of
the American Law Institute and its council support his position.'
Yet, apparently, no changes are going to be made in the text of
the restatement, and for these reasons, the writer thinks he
should make this last expression of his position.
I
For one thing, he thinks that a contract and specific terms in
uhe law of contracts should be defined in the terms of the funda-
mental legal concepts. He takes this position (1) because the
restatement of the law of property and other restatements of
the American Law Institute have defined their terms in this
way, and from the standpoint of style and uniformity it is desir-
able to pursue the same plan in all of the restatements; (2) be-
cause the restatement of the law of contracts itself thus defines
a quasi contract and an acceptance; and the law of torts, of
crimes, of trusts, of bailments and of public callings are custo-
marily Atated in this way, and the law of contracts should be
restated in the same way, not only for the sake of uniformity,
but for the sake of comparison; and (3) because any other
definition would be inaccurate.
It is not accurate to define a contract as a promise or set of
promises. It is true that you never have a contract unless there
is a promise. This is an operative fact which must exist before
there is ever a contract, but there are other operative facts
which also must exist before there is a contract. In a contract
under seal, for example, there must be the fact of sealing and
13 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 173, 183, 190, 193, 195, 204; 7 Proc. Am. Law.
Inst. 205, 207, 269-272, 276, 279, 292.
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the fact of delivery, and in an informal contract there must be
offer and acceptance, consideration, sometimes writing, and
always freedom from illegality. If a contract is to be defined in
the terms of the operative facts which are necessary for its
creation, then all of these operative facts should be named, but
for the reasons named above it is better to define a contract not
in the terms of the operative facts necessary to its creation, but
in the terms of the legal relations resulting from such operative
facts, as is generally done elsewhere in the law. To define a
contract as a promise or set of promises is like defining a house
as a tree or set of trees.
The legal relation which exists in a contract is a right-duty
relation, and a contract, therefore, should be defined either as a
right in personam or as a legal obligation.
The legal relation created by an offer, on the other hand, is not
a right-duty relation, but a power-liability relation. The prom-
isee who receives an offer from the promisor does not have a
right unless the offer itself is a contract, but merely a power, the
power to create an agreement by acceptance. An offer, there-
fore, should be defined as a conditional promise which gives
such power.
Consequently, he would suggest amendments to Section 12
and Section 24,3 so as to mae them read as follows:
SECTION 1. CONTRACT DEFINED
A contract is the legal obligation created by the law as the
result of a promise or set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty.
2 "Section 1. Contract Defined.
"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way
recognizes as a duty."
3 "Section 24. Offer Defined.
"An offer is a promise which is in its terms conditional upon an act,
forbearance or return promise being given in exchange for the promise or
its performance. An offer is also a contract, commonly called an option,
if the requisites of a formal or an informal contract exist, or if the rule
stated in Section 47 is applicable."
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SECTION 24. OFFER DEFINED
An offer is a conditional promise which gives to the offeree
the power by acceptance to create an agreement. An offer is also
a contract, commonly called an option, if the requisites of a
formal or an informal contract exist or if the rule stated in
Section 47 is applicable.
II
The American Law Institute's definition of agreement and
its statement as to the necessity of offer and acceptance are also,
in the judgment of the writer, inaccurate. An agreement can
arise only as the result of an offer and acceptance. An objective
meeting of the minds, while required by the law of contracts, is
not in itself enough. That objective meeting of the minds, or
expression of mutual assent, must be brought to pass by means
of offer and acceptance. If this were not so, cross-offers would
create an agreement, because there is a complete expression of
mutual assent and an objective meeting of the minds in such
case; but cross-offers are not enough to create an agreement. 4
The hypothetical suggested in the comment under Section 22 of
the American Law Institute's restatement is not one where there
is not an offer and acceptance, but one where there are probably
two offers and two acceptances. Even the reporter for this
restatement admits that this is true. The writer does not believe
any illustration can be given of a case where an agreement can
be found without an offer and acceptance.
Consequently, he suggests that Section 35 and Section 226 be
amended, so as to read as follows:
SECTION 3. AGREEMENT DEFINED
An agreement is an expression of mutual assent by two or
more persons by means of an offer and acceptance.
4 Tinn v. Hoffman, 29 Law Tr. (N. S.) 271 (1873).
5 "Section 3. Agreement Defined.
"An agreement is an expression of mutual assent by two or more
persons."
6 "Section 22. Offer and Acceptance.
"The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably takes the form
of an offer or proposal by one party accepted by the other party or
parties."
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SECTION 22. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
The manifestation of mutual assent invariably takes the form
of an offer or proposal by one party accepted by the other party
or parties. III
The American Law Institute's statement of the law when
there has been part performance after an offer for a unilateral
contract is inaccurate. The American Law Institute states that
after such part performance the offeror is bound by a contract
the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional upon
the giving or tender of the full consideration. It is true that
after part performance there is a contract, but it is not the
contract which the statement involves. After part performance,
the offer becomes irrevocable,7 and, therefore, a contract to keep
the offer open; but the contract, which will result after the exer-
cise of the power given to the offeree, has not been made yet and
cannot be made until the offeree has performed the entire act
called for by the offer. If he decides not to go on any further
with the performance there never will be a contract. However,
he has an irrevocable power to complete the contract, so that if
he so desires he may fully exercise the power. The only other
way that a contract could be procured would be on the theory of
promissory estoppel under. Section 90, but Section 90 could
hardly give the offeree after part performance a right to full
performance by the offeror, and therefore the promissory estop-
pel theory should be applied only so far as to create an irrevoc-
able offer or option.
Consequently, the writer suggests that Section 458 be phrased,
so as to read as follows:
SECTION 45. REVOCATION OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CONTRACT;
EFFECT OF PART PERFORMANCE OR TENDER.
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the
performance requested in the offer is given or tendered by the
7Los Angeles Traction Company v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654 (1902);
Half Co. v. Waugh, 183 S. W. 839 (1916); Zwolanek v. Baker Manufactur-
ing Company, 150 Wis. 517 (1912); A. B. Dick Company v. Fuller, 213
Fed. 98 (1914).
8 "Section 45. Revocation of Offer for Unilateral Contract; Effect of
Part Performance or Tender.
"If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the considera-
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offeree in response thereto, the offeror's power of revocation is
thereby destroyed, but there is no acceptance or other contract
than that to keep the offer open, unless and until the offeree com-
pletes the requested performance within the time stated in the
offer, or, if no time was there stated, within a reasonable time.
IV.
While the American Law Institute has done an admirable
piece of work in restating the law of consideration, yet it has not
cleared up a difficulty which has always existed between forbear-
ance to sue cases and pre-existing legal duty cases on the one
hand, and voidable contract cases and conditional contract cases,
on the other hand. (1) It has made exceptions of an act or a
promise which would amount to malicious prosecution, or which
would be only the giving up of the power to break a contract.
The reason for these exceptions is, of course, the fact of illegal-
ity. The law will not permit the refraining or the promise to
refrain from doing an illegal thing to be consideration. Why,
then, should only two kinds of illegality be singled out? The
refraining or the promise to refrain from committing a murder
would be consideration no more than the two cases which have
been singled out. (2) A promise is correctly defined in Section 2
so as to exclude an illusory promise. An illusory promise is the
same thing as no promise at all. It is neither the acceptance of
an offer for a bilateral contract nor consideration therefor. If
an infant's promise, other voidable promises, and conditional
promises are rationalized as illusory promises, that is, promises
to perform if a person chooses to perform, or if he does not
choose not to perform, they also would be illusory promises and
would have no further operative effect than any other illusory
promise. For this reason, all of these voidable and conditional
contracts will have to be rationalized as contracts where the
promisee has either given up or promised to give up some legal
right, power, privilege, or immunity; and where the power of
avoidance in voidable contracts relates to performance rather
than the formation of the contract. This is exactly what must
tion requested in the offer is given or tendered by the offeree in response
thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate per-
formance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or
tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein,
within a reasonable time."
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be the consideration in pre-existing legal duty cases and forbear-
ance to sue cases.9
Consequently, the writer would suggest the following substi-
tute section for the American Law Institutes definition of con-
sideration :10
SECTION 75. CONSIDERATION DEFINED.
(1) Consideration is an act or a promise including or involv-
ing some legal right, power, privilege, or immunity, other than
the power to do an illegal act, bargained for and given in ex-
change for a promise.
(2) Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some
other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other
person.
Or, Section 75 could be allowed to stand as it now reads, when
Section 7611 would have to be re-phrased so as to read as follows:
SECTION 76. WHAT ACTS OR FORBEARANCES ARE SUFFIENT
CONSIDERATION
Any act is sufficient consideration which includes or involves
some legal right, power, privilege, or immunity (1) other than
9 Willis, Consideration in Anglo-American Law, to be published soon in
the IndianaLaw Journal.
10 "Section 75. Definition of Consideration.
"(1) Consideration for a promise is
"(a) an act other than a promise, or
"(b) a forbearance, or
"(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
"(d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise.
"(2) Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some other
person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person."
11 "Section 76. What Acts or Forbearances Are Sufficient Consideration.
"Any consideration that is not a promise is sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement of Section 19 (c), except the following:
"(a) An act or forbearance required by a legal duty that is neither
doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable dispute if the duty is
owed either to the promisor or to the public, or, if imposed by the law of
torts or crimes, is owed to any person;
"(b) The surrender of, or forbearance to assert an invalid claim or
defense by one who has not an honest and reasonable belief in its possible
validity;
"(c) The transfer of money or fungible goods as consideration for a
promise to transfer at the same time and place a larger amount of money
or goods of the same kind and quality."
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the power to do an illegal act; (2) or the transfer of money or
fungible goods as consideration for a promise to transfer at the
same time and place a larger amount of money or goods of the
same kind and quality.
V.
A contract integration may be an integration of a promise
as well as an integration of an agreement. A contract under
seal, of course, is an illustration of an integration of a promise.
Yet Chapter 9 of the restatement discusses only integration of
agreement.
Consequently, the writer suggests that Section 22412 (227)
be amended to read as follows:
SECTION 224 (227)
A contract is integrated where the party or parties thereto
adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression
of his promise or their agreement. An integration is the writ-
ing or writings so adopted.
VI
In its classification of conditions, the American Law Insti-
tute has classified conditions as express or constructive, and as
precedent, concurrent or subsequent, but it has not classified
conditions as casual (fortuitous) or promissory. The classifica-
tion of conditions as casual or promissory is fully as important
as the other classifications. This is proven by the fact that the
American Law Institute itself uses these concepts in Sections
246 (249), 253 (256), 256 (259), 261 (264),288 (291), and Sec-
tion 301 (304).
Consequently, the writer proposes the addition of new sections
defining these two conditions as follows:
SECTION -. CASUAL CONDITION DEFINED.
A casual condition is a condition which merely suspends a
duty of immediate performance until it exists or extinguishes
such duty upon its existence.
12 "Section 224. An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto
adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the
agreement. An integration is the writing or writings so adopted."
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SECTION -. PROMISSORY CONDITION DEFINED.
A promissory condition is a condition which is both a casual
condition and a promise, so that it both suspends or extinguishes
a duty of immediate performance of a primary obligation and
in addition, if broken, gives rise to a secondary obligation.
Then the title for Section 25313 (256) should be changed by
substituting the title "Casual and Promissory Conditions," and
the title for Section 25614 (259) should be changed so as to sub-
stitute the words "Casual and Promissory Conditions Inter-
preted," and Section 28815 should be re-phrased so as to read
as follows:
SECTION 288. EXCUSE OF CONDITION, EVENT No LONGER A
CONDITION
If a condition in a contract is excused, the promisor whose
performance depends thereon becomes subject to a duty to per-
form without the existence or occurrence of the condition, but
if such condition is a promissory condition damages will be re-
coverable for breach thereof, and the damages recoverable for
breach of the conditional duty are not always the same as they
would have been if the condition existed or occurred.
HUGH E. WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
13 "Section 253. Non-Existence of Condition Distinguished from Breach
of Promise."
14 "Section 256. Words of Promise Distinguished from Words of
Condition."
15 "Section 288. Excuse of Condition Means Event Is No Longer a
Condition.
"If a condition in a contract is excused, the promisor becomes subject
to a duty to perform without the existence or occurrence of the condition,
but the damages recoverable for breach of the duty are not always the
same as they would have been if the condition existed or occurred."
